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 1 
Kimberly Hutchings 
 
Universalism in Feminist International Ethics: gender and the difficult labour of 
translation
1
 
 
Without translation, the very concept of 
universality cannot cross the linguistic borders it 
claims in principle, to be able to cross. Or we 
might put it another way: without translation, the 
only way the assertion of universality can cross a 
border is through a colonial and expansionist 
logic. (Butler, ‘Restaging the Universal: 
Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism’ in 
Butler, Laclau & Žižek Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: contemporary dialogues on the left, 
London, Verso, 2000: 35) 
 
Introduction 
The question of universality is at the heart of debates in international ethics, 
both feminist and non-feminist. For some ethical theorists, there can be no such thing 
as an international ethics without the presumption of strong moral universalism. For 
others, it is the absence of moral universalism that is the starting point for 
international ethics. Yet again, for many ethical theorists, the task for international 
ethics is to establish some kind of middle way between ‘cosmopolitan’ (universalist) 
and ‘communitarian’ (particularist) alternatives. Debates over moral universalism are, 
of course, not new. Neither are they peculiar to those of us concerned with the 
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domains of international, world or global politics. Nevertheless, when the ethical 
issues with which one is dealing are relevant to the latter domains, issues of 
universality as a matter of both the ground and scope of moral judgment become 
particularly salient. One cannot address questions about transnational distributive 
justice, the ethics of war or other kinds of cross-border intervention without 
addressing the issue of whether answers to such questions can be meaningful and/ or 
authoritative trans-nationally, across boundaries of culture and power. This paper 
examines arguments of thinkers concerned with how to authorise moral judgments 
across these kinds of boundaries, beginning with Hegel.  
I will argue that Hegel’s arguments about the ‘moral point of view’ provide 
resources to address the impasses inherent in the ways in which ‘universality’ (and 
therefore also ‘particularity’ and ‘singularity’) figure in debates in international ethics 
between cosmopolitan (moral universalism), communitarian (moral particularism) 
and care ethics (moral singularism). However, even though Hegel offers a powerful 
deconstruction of the logic of moral judgment, he does little to help with working out 
the positive implications of that deconstruction for international ethics. It is here that 
the work of certain feminist moral theorists becomes of interest. The turn to dialogical 
or communicative ethics in the arguments of thinkers such as Benhabib and Butler is 
very much a response to the problems of grounding moral judgment identified by 
Hegel.
2
 In Benhabib’s case, I will argue that her Habermasian understanding of the 
presuppositions of dialogue tends to lock her back into the unsustainable logic of 
moral universalism. In the case of Butler, however, her re-thinking of the ethical 
universal (which builds explicitly on a reading of Hegel) as the ongoing ‘difficult 
labour of cultural translation’, provides a possible way forward.3 ‘Cultural 
translation’, on Butler’s account, is a perpetual process, which invariably involves 
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loss of purity of meaning on all sides, but which nevertheless admits the possibility of 
forging common ethical vocabularies. This offers a way of keeping the idea of ethical 
universality in play even within the complex and hierarchical plurality of 
international and trans-national politics.  
 
The Moral Point of View, Culture and the Beautiful Soul 
  
 Hegel engages explicitly with the question of the grounding of moral 
judgment in his discussion of the ‘moral point of view’ in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit.
4
 On Hegel’s account, the attempt to think in terms of the ‘moral point of view’ 
ultimately relies on unsustainable assumptions. We can see this with regard both to 
the Kantian moral point of view, in which morality is grounded in universal reason 
(the universalizability of will) and in the figure of the beautiful soul, the purity of 
conscience of the Romantic moral subject. In the first case, moral thinking is 
grounded in the universal, in the latter case, it is grounded in the singular – but Hegel 
argues that in neither case can universality or singularity be understood consistently 
in the sense that is required by the moral point of view, that is to say as pure, self-
subsistent categories. 
 Hegel reads Kant’s moral philosophy as premised on the autonomy of the 
moral will (pure practical reason, Wille) in contradistinction to the heteronomy of the 
will influenced by natural, sensuous determination (Willkür). The universality 
inherent in moral principle is a consequence of the detachment of moral reason from 
nature and spirit, the realm of particularity. It is precisely because anyone would 
recognise that X or Y (for instance, telling the truth or keeping promises) is right that 
the moral actor can be sure that X or Y is right. The moral act, therefore, is 
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understood as a singular event (this truth telling or promise keeping), or particular 
events (truth tellings, promise keepings), which are subsumed under the universal and 
thereby detached from particularity in general.
5
 Hegel understands the aim of moral 
reason to be to bring particular acts under the rule of universality, effectively wiping 
out their status as particular (they become instances of the universal). Moral 
judgment, therefore, is a matter of judging whether these acts or this act can be 
subsumed under the universal or not. For Hegel, this way of thinking about moral 
judgment raises problems of both the content and form of how the singular act or 
particular acts are related to the universal. The first question to be raised is about how 
the universal is held to inhere in the singular/ particular on this account of moral 
judgment? Is it through a ‘third party’, which provides external criteria to bridge the 
gap between universal and singular/ particular? Is it the singular act itself that 
provides the bridge between universal and particular? And what does this tell us 
about the meaning of the copula, the ‘is’ that holds the different parts of judgment 
together?
6
  
Much of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s account of moral judgment can be 
understood as focused on the ‘content’ of the copula. The argument he repeatedly 
makes is that the ‘purity’ of the universal does not stand on examination of what is 
actually involved in Kant’s account, from the insertion of concrete details into the 
process of universalization to the embodied and enculturated (naturally and spiritually 
contaminated) nature of action in the world. For Hegel, Kant’s argument is 
inadequate insofar as it does not provide the resources by which to think the 
interconnection of particular and universal in the singular act, which is required by 
Kant’s own reasoning.7 Ultimately, this is because of the absoluteness of the 
distinction between rational and natural determination in Kant’s thought. In this 
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context, Hegel argues that morality becomes a perpetual striving towards an ought-to-
be, which is out of reach because it seeks to abolish the diremptions, both logical and 
ontological, which it nevertheless requires.  
Still engaging with the ‘moral point of view’, Hegel moves on in the 
Phenomenology to examine an alternative account of moral reasoning, which was part 
of the Romantic reaction to the formalism and legalism of Kant’s moral theory. 
According to this view, rather than being located in universal moral law, the 
possibility of moral judgment is grounded in conscience and purity of heart.
8
 This 
way of thinking about morality is presented through the figure of the ‘beautiful soul’. 
The beautiful soul is the romantic hero/ heroine who exemplifies the perfection of 
moral subjectivity (the inner certainty of what it right). As such, the beautiful soul is a 
singularity which posits itself as the ground of connection between universality and 
particularity, shifting the ground of judgment from predicate to subject.
9
 Hegel goes 
on to argue that the logic of Kantian moral thinking is ultimately replicated rather 
than refuted from the point of view of the beautiful soul. For the beautiful soul it is 
the twin distinctions between spirit and nature and between identity and difference 
that underpin the authority of her moral voice. The disembodied purity of the ‘inner 
self’ of the beautiful soul identifies moral authority with disengagement from nature 
(sensuous determination), but also with a power located in an understanding of spirit 
as pure individuated self-legislation, disconnected from both spiritual and natural 
aspects of the world. In contrast to Kantian moral thought, with the beautiful soul, the 
moral law is located within the exemplary moral subject, it is not rationally, 
externally accessible or knowable, and its authority derives from its singular source 
rather than its universal significance. Yet, Hegel argues, if we examine the content 
and form of this moral judgment in which the positions of singular and universal in 
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the judgment of the moral point of view are reversed, we nevertheless find the same 
impossibility of grasping the interconnection between the moments of judgment 
except as the abolition of the terms in which it is grounded. Hegel sets out to show 
that there are in effect two options open to the beautiful soul, in its own terms, both of 
which effectively undermine her moral authority. One option is for the beautiful soul 
to exercise moral authority, agency and judgment. But if this option is followed, the 
purity and detachment of the beautiful soul immediately becomes compromised and 
mired in particularity. The other option is to withdraw into the ethereality of moral 
perfection, in which the beautiful soul dwells directly in the universal, and therefore 
also dies on Hegel’s account.10 The option of withdrawal undermines the singularity 
of the beautiful soul as a bridge between universality and particularity just as much as 
the intervention of the beautiful soul in the world undermines it. This is a different 
story to the story of Kantian morality, but the logic of judgment where the limitations 
of judgment, in both content and form, are not acknowledged is at the heart of 
Hegel’s critique in both cases. 
Hegel’s deconstructive critique of the moral point of view and of the beautiful 
soul can be applied to three forms of moral thinking, with their attendant logics of 
judgment, which are influential in contemporary debates in international ethics.
11
 
These are: moral universalism, which includes the substantive ‘human nature’ 
universalisms of Aristotelianism or utilitarianism, but also procedural universalisms 
of a Kantian type;
12
 moral particularism as exemplified in versions of 
communitarianism in which morality is held to be relative to culture;
13
 and moral 
singularism as we find it at work in exemplary or virtue ethics. Although there are 
examples of feminist moral universalisms and particularisms in debates within 
international ethics, it has tended to be the third form of ethics, moral singularism, 
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which has dominated feminist contributions to international ethical debate in the idea 
of an ethic of care, which draws on the arguments of thinkers such as Ruddick and 
Gilligan.
14
   
The feminist ethic of care, within international ethics, is presented as an 
alternative to both moral universalism and moral particularism.
15
 It represents the 
dissatisfaction of feminist thinkers with moral universalisms which are premised on a 
particular, masculinist account of what it means to be human (in terms of substantive 
accounts of human nature and rationality), and with moral particularisms which are 
premised on accepting the dominant, patriarchal norms of culture as equivalent to 
culture itself. This form of moral thinking, in a move reminiscent of the ‘beautiful 
soul’, identifies the ground of moral judgment as being in the singular, the specific 
voice that nevertheless carries exemplary, universal significance. On this account of 
morality, the judgments that X is good, X is a good woman or X acted rightly are 
authoritative insofar as they can be seen as grounded in the singular. That is to say, 
they are not authorised by universal rule or given cultural norm, but by the ways in 
which the singular agent has arrived at them in the context of the duties and 
responsibilities which are inherent in her singular being and experience.  
From a Hegelian point of view, the feminist ethic of care raises questions as to 
the content and form of the extremes and copula of judgment within this approach to 
ethics. How are the content and form of singularity to be understood? How are the 
content and form of universality (‘good’, ‘right’) to be understood? And how does 
this kind of moral thinking configure the relation between singularity, universality 
and particularity? Unpacking the content of singularity reveals a variety of 
possibilities. If the singularity is the singularity of the carer, then is this to be 
understood as an instance of generic virtues embedded in care as such, or as a 
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category of persons, such as ‘women’ or ‘mothers’? If the former, then singularity 
collapses straightforwardly into universality, and therefore into a form of moral 
universalism. If the latter, then the category of women or mothers has itself to be 
unpacked, is this all women/ mothers, some women/ mothers, a specific woman/ 
mother? What are the criteria for what counts as women/ mothers? And should 
woman/ mother be understood as a universal or a particular? A common universalist 
critique of the feminist ethic of care is that it is a form of moral particularism, in 
which judgment is made relative to context, and which falls into contradiction 
because of the denial of its reliance on universal categories in a similar way to 
communitarianism.
16
 From a communitarian point of view, however, the critique 
more likely to be made is that the ethic of care is universalism masquerading as 
particularism, in which the particularity of practices inherent in Western culture are 
illegitimately claimed to be of universal significance.
17
  
It would seem that the very idea of moral judgment is put into question by a 
Hegelian analysis, rendering us unable to make the claims ‘X is good’, ‘X is a good 
woman’, ‘X acted rightly’ which are both the subject matter of moral theory and part 
and parcel of our everyday existence. However, one could read Hegel’s purpose 
differently, so that rather than endorsing the abolition of judgment he is pointing to 
the need for a much more careful examination of the complex conditions of 
possibility which underpin the intelligibility and authority of moral claims. The 
purpose of the above discussion was not to suggest that moral universalism, moral 
particularism or moral singularism fail as ways of formulating the meaning of moral 
claims, but it is to suggest that in each case it is the ways in which the categories of 
universality, particularity and singularity are thought which sets up difficulties for 
judgment. In the light of this it is unsurprising that much debate in moral theory, both 
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feminist and non-feminist is about how to find ways ‘between’ the alternatives of 
moral universalism, particularism and singularism.  
Within feminist ethics, including international ethics, the difficulties of 
accounting for moral judgment in universal, particular or singular terms have been 
particularly vexing. This is evident both in ongoing debates about ‘ethic of justice’ 
versus ‘ethic of care’ and in the problems raised by challenges to the idea that the 
ethical significance of ‘women’ or the ‘feminine’ can be understood in unitary terms, 
given the boundaries of culture and power between different women. In recent years, 
the most common response to the complexities of moral judgment for feminists has 
been to insist on the need for actual communicative interaction between different 
feminine moral subjects as the only way to ground a morally authoritative feminist 
discourse. This dialogical turn seeks to negotiate between universality, particularity 
and singularity and avoid the pitfalls inherent in according a transcendental 
significance to any one of these terms. In the following sections I examine two 
attempts to get beyond the paradoxes of judgment through a focus on the 
presuppositions of communication, those of Benhabib and Butler. Both of these 
theorists are to some extent influenced by Hegel’s critique of the ‘moral point of 
view’.18  
 
Dialogical Universalism 
 
Benhabib established the basis of her dialogical ethics in her essays in 
Situating the Self: gender, community and postmodernism in contemporary ethics.
19
 
Within this collection of essays, her analysis is always framed by the need to eschew 
abstract moral universalisms that are, in practice, exclusive, but also to avoid a lapse 
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into the moral relativism she identifies in communitarian and feminist forms of moral 
particularism. Gender plays into both aspects of Benhabib’s argument. On the one 
hand, gender represents those aspects of concrete identity that are overlooked by 
abstract universalisms, of a Kantian or Habermasian kind.
20
 On the other, the 
particularity of gendered identity signifies the limits of morality insofar as it loses 
touch with the ethics of inclusion that is Benhabib’s initial response to the claims of 
gender.
21
 Thus, within the book, Kantian and liberal approaches to ethics are 
condemned for being unable to recognise and encompass concrete gendered 
identities. But at the same time, the feminist ethic of care is condemned for remaining 
locked into a particularist world-view. Benhabib’s answer as to how to escape from a 
choice between abstract universalism and concrete particularism in moral theory is 
dialogical. It builds on Habermas’s communicative ethics and the principles of 
‘universal respect’ and ‘egalitarian reciprocity’, which Habermas sees as built into the 
presuppositions of genuine communication. But Benhabib departs from Habermas in 
emphasising the importance of real dialogue between ‘concrete’, and not only 
‘generalized’ others, in working through the implications of what universal respect 
and egalitarian reciprocity mean. This means that dialogue, as a basis for ethical 
judgment, cannot be understood in wholly rationalistic terms, but requires the 
exercise of empathy and imagination. Within this dialogue, the moral subject relies on 
an ability to put herself in another’s place, see from their point of view and therefore 
enlarge their mentality in the business of moral judgment and prescription.
22
 
- - - if we view discourses as moral conversations in 
which we exercise reversibility of perspective either 
by actually listening to all involved or be representing 
to ourselves imaginatively the many perspectives of 
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those involved, then this procedure is also an aspect 
of the skills of moral imagination and moral narrative 
which good judgment involves whatever else it might 
involve. There is no incompatibility between the 
exercise of moral intuition guided by an egalitarian 
and universalist model of conversation and the 
exercise of contextual judgment.
23
 
Benhabib’s emphasis on this model of dialogue as the procedural solution to tensions 
between universalist and particularist strands of moral theory implies the need for 
institutional arrangements by which such dialogue could be secured. This leads in her 
work to an argument for deliberative democracy as the ideal political arrangement 
within political communities and, as we shall see, guides her view about appropriate 
responses to ethical questions in a global context.
24
 
In her book, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global 
Era,
25
 Benhabib applies her argument for this moderated form of Habermasian 
discourse ethics to the claims of multiculturalism for respect for cultural difference 
within and across political communities. Although Benhabib is not primarily 
concerned with gender or feminism in this text, nevertheless gender continues to 
mark the limits of morality, both by reminding us of the importance of concrete 
identity and by signifying the dangers of moral particularism. However, although this 
dual aspect of Benhabib’s argument is carried through from her earlier work, the 
emphasis is now much more on the inclusive, universalist as opposed to the 
particularist aspects of her analysis. She continues to argue for the importance of 
genuine dialogue, which takes account of concrete as well as generalized aspects of 
others and insists that awareness of the ‘otherness of others’ can only come about 
 12 
through exposure to their unfamiliar narratives of self-identification.
26
 At the same 
time, however, gender is most often invoked in relation to the position of women as a 
warning against strong multiculturalist claims for group rights and as a reminder of 
the importance of universal human rights and equal membership of the deliberative 
polity for feminist conceptions of justice and the good.
27
  She argues against strong 
pluralist responses to the claims of culture, in which different rights are assigned on 
the basis of cultural membership either within a given state or through secession, and 
for a deliberative democratic solution to the accommodation of difference, both 
within liberal democratic states and more broadly across the global arena, wherever 
discursive (which is to say, moral) community forms.
28
  
In The Claims of Culture, Benhabib’s argument relies on three main planks. 
The first is an essentially sociological argument for the looseness and hybridity of 
cultures, backed up by an epistemological case against the idea of radical 
incommensurability. Benhabib uses this to sustain her position against radical 
pluralist responses to the moral claims of different cultures.
29
 Her positive case for 
inclusive deliberative democracy depends on the further two planks of what she terms 
‘weak transcendentalism’ and ‘historically enlightened universalism’ respectively.30 
The term ‘weak transcendentalism’ refers to necessary constraints on the form that 
justificatory strategies underpinning rational agreement about normative claims may 
take (in accordance with the conditions on communicative reason as explored by 
Habermas and Apel)
31. These conditions are the conditions of ‘universal respect’ and 
‘egalitarian reciprocity’ established in Situating the Self, in which all participants in 
the moral dialogue are accorded equal rights of participation and all are committed to 
understanding from the other’s point of view.32 The term ‘historically enlightened 
universalism’ refers to the processes of moral learning (‘through commerce as well as 
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wars; international agreements as well as international threats’) through which 
individuals and groups come to appreciate (or at least accept) the superiority of the 
norms of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity that are inseparable from 
communicative reason.
33
  
It is in the public sphere, situated within civil society, 
that multicultural struggles have their place, and that 
political and moral learning and value transformation 
occur.
34
 
What follows from Benhabib’s argument in relation to feminist morality across 
cultures and states is that it must take the form of a ‘pluralistically enlightened ethical 
universalism’.35 Feminist actors in different places and radically different cultures and 
positions of power, must accept dialogue, under principles of universal respect and 
egalitarian reciprocity, as the means to articulate and legitimate conceptions of justice 
and the good and the principles and norms which follow from them. For Benhabib 
civilization is inherent in communicative reason, the presuppositions of this reason 
demand that the other be acknowledged, in detachment from their particular identity, 
as a human being as such. Whether they like it or not, all cultures and communities 
must learn this lesson if a global feminist ethics is to be possible, since it is only on 
the basis of this ‘universal respect’ and ‘egalitarian reciprocity’ that the plurality of 
different women can be guaranteed participation in moral discourse in the first place. 
Thus, Benhabib’s dialogical ethics offers a resolution of the tension between 
feminist moral universalism and moral particularism in the international sphere, by 
holding out the possibility of a transnational feminist moral community, which is 
formed through giving voice to all perspectives in moral and political debate. But 
how adequate is this as a resolution of the terms of moral judgment? Critics of 
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Benhabib’s argument have drawn attention to her account of the presuppositions of 
‘moral conversation’ and argued that, rather than resolving the tension between the 
terms of judgment, Benhabib becomes trapped in an attempt to give transcendental 
significance to a version of moral universalism, that can then be demonstrated to be 
haunted by its particularity. This kind of critique takes two forms: a critique of 
Benhabib’s account of the dialogue between self and other; and a critique of the 
substantive political implications of Benhabib’s moral argument.  
In an essay written in response to Benhabib’s arguments in Situating the Self, 
Iris Young takes issue with Benhabib’s elaboration of her discursive ethical ideal.36 
Although Young endorses Benhabib’s argument for the re-thinking of ethical 
relations in a way that accommodates the ‘concrete’ as well as the ‘generalized’ other, 
nevertheless Young sees her as making a mistake in identifying universal respect and 
egalitarian reciprocity with symmetry and reversibility of perspective.
37
 For Young, 
this implies a tendency to assimilate difference to sameness, by always assuming that 
the other’s point of view will be intelligible in the self’s own terms. Instead, Young 
calls for a ‘taking account’ of others’ perspectives and the relations between them, 
without assuming the possibility of seeing things from the other’s point of view: 
It is more appropriate to approach a situation of 
communicative interaction for the purpose of 
arriving at a moral or political judgement with a 
stance of moral humility. In moral humility one 
starts with the assumption that one cannot see 
things from the other person’s perspective and 
waits to learn by listening to the other person to 
what extent they have had similar experiences.
38
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Young’s account of ‘communication’ substitutes the model of the gift relation and the 
idea of asymmetrical reciprocity for the relation of equal exchange and symmetrical 
reciprocity that she identifies in Benhabib’s (following Habermas’s) account of 
‘discourse’.39 She (Young) stresses that communication may be a creative process:  
- - - in which the other person offers a new 
expression, and I understand it not because I am 
looking for how it fits with given paradigms, but 
because I am open and suspend my assumptions in 
order to listen.
40
  
Young claims that Benhabib’s argument is based on an unnecessarily 
constricted model of dialogue because it makes overly strong assumptions about the 
reversibility of position and perspective of participants in the public realm and 
thereby misunderstands the politics of moral engagement itself. This suggests that the 
moral relation inherent in the discursive ideal has a rather different political dynamic 
than the essentially liberal egalitarianism that characterizes Benhabib’s account.41 The 
danger Young is pointing to in Benhabib’s dialogical ethics takes us back to the two 
kinds of work that references to gender accomplish in Benhabib’s argument. On the 
one hand, gender is the mark of concrete difference and the limit of abstract 
universalist accounts of moral reasoning. On the other hand, gender is the mark of the 
limits of moral particularism, both in the feminist ethic of care and in communitarian 
arguments that use culture to trump claims for women’s equal rights. Young’s 
critique of Benhabib suggests that even at the level of the model of dialogue itself, the 
sameness signified by gender trumps the difference that it also signifies and that 
therefore Benhabib’s ethics risks lapsing into the assimilative universalism she herself 
criticizes in Kantian and Habermasian moral theory. 
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A second line of criticism of Benhabib’s argument focuses more on the 
historical assumptions and political implications of her ethical arguments, where 
again it is argued that her openness to difference is more dramatically constrained 
than she admits.
42
 This is clear from the institutional specification of conditions and 
constraints on dialogue in the public sphere. In both cases, the principles of universal 
respect and egalitarian reciprocity rule out certain kind of identities/ groups and 
certain kinds of arguments in advance.
43
 So that, for instance, it is clearly the case that 
certain moral judgements in the name of feminism must be possible in the light of the 
conditions of dialogue. By definition, it would not be possible for participants to find 
themselves unable to agree on the principle of equal rights for women, though they 
might differ as to how that principle should be applied.  
The above objections point to a certain principled exclusivity in Benhabib’s 
version of Habermas’s discursive ideal, which becomes more obvious when her 
argument moves from the domestic to the international context. When the apparently 
egalitarian discursive ideal is operationalized transnationally it turns out to reflect a 
hierarchical relation in morality that maps onto, and could be used to endorse, actual 
hierarchies of power. Benhabib is well aware that accepting the guidance of the 
norms inherent in communicative reason is not something that comes about through 
an examination of the logic of argumentation alone, either within or between states. 
And here she calls upon a Habermasian theory of modernity to supplement the ‘weak 
transcendentalism’ of discourse ethics.44 Like Habermas, Benhabib sees the 
‘generalized moral attitude of equality towards human beings’ qua human beings as 
an historical achievement, one which has been carried by both coercive and 
communicative encounters between cultures and political communities over time. 
This collective moral learning is clearly most advanced in ‘cultural life-worlds and 
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worldviews under conditions of modernity’ and this might be seen to pose problems 
for moral and political questions which involve cultures and communities in debates 
over moral principles which do not necessarily accept either an attitude of 
egalitarianism to human beings as such (the moral point of view), or the distinctions 
between the moral (universal principles), the ethical (norms specific to culture or 
community) and the evaluative (values specific to culture, community or individual) 
which Habermas and Benhabib draw.
45
 However, Benhabib does not see this as an 
insuperable problem because of the way, as she see it, in which interdependence is 
opening up all cultures to the moral lessons of modernity. Speaking of the different 
extent to which cultures may have internalised distinctions between moral, ethical and 
evaluative, Benhabib states: 
Increasingly, though, the globalized world we are 
inhabiting compels cultural traditions that may not 
have generated these differentiations in the course of 
their own development to internalise them or to learn 
to coexist in a political and legal world with other 
cultures that operate with some form of these 
differentiations. Many traditional cultures, for 
example, still consider women’s and children’s rights 
as an aspect of their ethical life-world, of the ways 
things are done in that particular culture. However, 
the international discourse on women’s rights, the 
activism of international development and aid 
organizations, migration, and television programmes 
are transforming these assumptions.
46
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From the point of view of grounding an international feminist ethics 
Benhabib’s linking of discursive ethics to the historical specificity of modernity poses 
problems both in principle and in practice. In principle, the worry is that we return to 
an assimilative universalism in which the plurality of womens’ identities and 
experiences become subsumed under a western liberal model of what it means to be a 
human being. In practice, it becomes clear that the conditions underpinning the 
discourses needed to agree on global moral norms are stringently liberal. They 
therefore require a high degree of coincidence of moral starting points in the first 
place, which cannot in fact be taken for granted.  
Benhabib claims to offer a way through the tensions between universalist and 
particularist feminisms, by holding out the possibility of a transnational feminist 
moral community, which is formed through giving voice to all perspectives in moral 
and political debate. On examination, however, her handling of the terms of moral 
judgment (universal, particular and singular) through a dialogical ethic ends up much 
closer to Hegel’s account of the ‘moral point of view’ than it initially promised. In the 
end, the ‘weak transcendentalism’ of discourse ethics carries more weight in relation 
to the ethical significance of gender than the ‘concrete other’ that gender also 
signifies. This means that much more comes to rest on the claim to universality, in 
contradistinction to particularity and singularity, as a ground for moral judgement 
than Hegel’s analysis of the logic of judgment suggests that it can bear. Ultimately 
this is to do with the account of communication that Benhabib derives from 
Habermas, in which dialogue presupposes a high degree of coincidence in the 
meaning of moral subjectivity and agency for the parties involved.  
 
Restaging the Universal 
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Butler’s work is premised on a rejection of the Habermasian account of the 
logic of communication. For Butler difference and asymmetries of power are inherent 
in all attempts to articulate moral principles and values. In her recent work, Butler has 
returned to Hegel’s arguments to help articulate her understanding of moral judgment 
and her ethical commitments in a post 9/11 world. In Butler’s case, however, her 
Hegelianism is given what she terms a Foucaultian ‘twist’, which is crucial for her 
particular understanding of moral judgment. There are two aspects to the ways in 
which Butler re-appropriates Hegel in her recent work: the first is in her re-thinking 
of the category of the ‘human’ as a contingently universal category in terms of an 
idea of ‘liveability’;47 the second is in her use of Hegel’s arguments to challenge 
moral universalism (both substantive and procedural) and moral particularism 
(cultural relativism) and formulate her alternative in the notion of ‘cultural 
translation’.48 
In my view, Hegel has given us an ek-static 
notion of the self, one which is of necessity 
outside itself, not self-identical, differentiated 
from the start.
49
 
 In the essays in Undoing Gender, Butler draws on Hegel’s account of the self, 
desire and recognition in the Phenomenology. Two aspects of her argument are 
particularly significant: first, as in the above quotation, her agreement with Hegel’s 
account of the self as always already ‘outside itself’; second, the Foucaultian twist she 
gives to Hegel’s account of recognition in her claim that ‘norms of recognition 
function to produce and to de-produce the notion of the human’50. The idea of the self 
as outside itself, or, as she puts it elsewhere, as a ‘porous boundary’ expresses, for 
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Butler, that the meaning of any singular human life (the identity and capacities of 
unique individuals) is given by complex culturally and institutionally embedded 
patterns and norms of recognition which enable sense to be made of that singular life, 
by both the individual concerned and others. In this sense, individual selves are 
fundamentally mediated by other individuals and by embedded norms of recognition, 
which Hegel would have referred to as ‘objective spirit’. One of the most important 
ways in which this is evident to Butler is in relation to gender, which is at once at the 
heart of the individual’s sense of self and outside of individual control (‘But the terms 
that make up one’s own gender are, from the start, outside oneself, beyond oneself in 
a sociality that has no single author - -’)51. The crucial point for Butler is that every 
singular life is dependent on modes of recognition that are not individually authored 
or under the control of any specific ‘self’ or ‘other’. It is here that the Foucaultian 
twist to her argument comes in, because, she argues, the dependence of self on 
recognition is necessarily ‘bound up with the question of power and with the problem 
of who qualifies as recognizably human and who does not’52. This is because 
culturally and institutionally embedded norms of recognition are not neutral 
reflections of what it means to be human, but rather constitute the conditions of 
possibility of a liveable human life.  
 Butler’s notion of ‘liveability’ encompasses both the literal and the psychic/ 
social chances of surviving of any given individual. Her examples here draw on her 
experience of human rights activism in relation to the rights of lesbian, gay, trans-
sexual and trans-gendered humans, and the ways in which the liveability of such lives 
is limited, and often entirely prohibited by the dominant norms of recognition in 
different national and cultural contexts. Prohibition may mean literal killing or injury 
(reflecting a primal bodily vulnerability which Butler sees as indissolubly bound up 
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with the self’s other primal vulnerability, derived from its dependence on 
recognition). But prohibition may also mean the impossibility of engaging in certain 
practices or the necessity of concealing aspects of one’s being and/ or doing from 
others. Butler’s point is not that all individuals are determined in who they are and 
what they do by norms of recognition, but rather that such norms enable certain lives 
and disable others, and that there is no liveable life without recognition. The 
importance of human rights discourse, for Butler, is that it enables the articulation of 
alternative norms of recognition that permit the extension of the category of the 
human to those who have traditionally been excluded from it.
53
  
As Butler sees it, the question of which lives are to be allowed to be liveable, 
or of who is to count as human is foundational to ethics. The problem is that the ways 
in which this question has traditionally been answered in moral theory has either 
required the establishment norms of recognition that somehow transcend the ‘given 
over’ nature of the human condition (moral universalism, moral singularism), or, 
required the acceptance of the contextually dominant norms of recognition as 
authoritative (moral particularism). Butler is unhappy with both of these responses. 
With the first because, following Hegel, she does not think such transcendence is 
possible. With the second because there are no grounds on which to dismiss the 
alternative (to the dominant) articulations of the norms governing liveability that 
don’t also require transcendence of the ‘given over’ in the sense of articulating some 
account of why dominant norms should be privileged as such. Butler is therefore 
looking for an approach to ethics that retains the inclusive ambition of universalist 
discourses (such as that of universal human rights) without relying on a claim to false 
transcendence via the specification of a universal ontological or procedural ground, 
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and without collapsing into a status-quo cultural relativism. In order to develop such a 
position, Butler again turns to Hegel.  
In the essay ‘Restaging the Universal: hegemony and the limits of formalism’, 
Butler uses Hegel’s account of the logic of ‘universality’ to underpin a critique of 
both moral universalism and moral particularism. She follows Hegel (as outlined in 
the previous section) in tracing the difficulties encountered by attempts to locate the 
authority of moral judgments in universal (moral ontology or moral law) or particular 
(culture) grounds. In her summary of the outcomes of her engagement with Hegel’s 
logic, Butler lists four key points. The first is that it is impossible purely at the level 
of judgment to disentangle the universal from the other terms of judgment. Every 
time the meaning of the universal in itself is unpacked it involves reference to either 
particular or singular and, at different points in this unpacking, the universal becomes 
subsumed under particular or singular, just as the latter are in turn subsumed under 
the universal. Even at the most formal level, therefore, the meaning of the universal is 
unstable and implicated in that which it supposedly transcends. The second point that 
Butler derives from Hegel’s account is that the specification of the universal is always 
haunted by the particularity or singularity to which it is opposed. Here, the argument 
is more substantive, since Butler suggests that this ‘haunting’ takes two forms in 
supposedly universal judgments: a ‘spectral doubling’ and the clinging of 
particularity to universality. Here, Butler is referring to the way that the spectre of 
genuinely inclusive universality is deferred (and therefore collapses into 
particularity), but also referred to, in any given universal judgment. For instance the 
universal human right to marriage and family life at the same time constitutes the 
exclusion of lesbians and gays from the universal (and thereby identifies the universal 
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with the particular – heterosexual men and women) and, in purporting to be genuinely 
inclusive, alludes to a universality that would not collapse into particularity.  
Butler’s third and fourth points, derived from her reading of Hegel, follow 
from the first two and relate to accounts of the moral universal that claim to be trans-
cultural and accounts of the cultural that claim to be singular. For Butler, ‘the relation 
of universality to its cultural articulation is insuperable’.54 She illustrates this by 
demonstrating how different substantive and procedural moral universalisms are only 
intelligible to the extent that they articulate their claims in terms that are drawn from 
available frameworks of meaning. Such frameworks inevitably reflect certain patterns 
and norms of recognition as opposed to others, and their universalizability is therefore 
dependent on the universalization of particularity as a matter of politics and history 
and not just as a matter of logic. However, the logic of universality also indicates that 
just as universality is contaminated by particularity and singularity, so are 
particularity and singularity contaminated by universality. This means that ‘culture’ 
cannot be thought of as a discrete and unique entity any more than the individual can 
be thought of in this way. Butler’s point, again following Hegel, is that the attempt to 
reduce the ground of moral judgment to any one of its possible terms invariably fails. 
So what does this imply for international ethics in a complex, plural and 
interconnected world? At a formal level, Butler is clearly arguing that standard moral 
universalisms, particularisms and singularisms are all posited on a mistaken 
understanding of the ways in which the logic of judgment works. Instead, she argues 
that any adequate account of moral judgment needs to recognise that the interrelation 
between universality, particularity and singularity is fluid and open, in the sense that 
its meaning is always capable of re-signification. At the same time, however, any 
such re-signification is always conditioned and therefore fails to keep the promise of 
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the idea of universality, even as it keeps that promise in place. For Butler, this does 
not mean the abandonment of universality as a meaningful category in ethics.
55
 Part 
of her argument is that the universal is an ineradicable category, whether we like it or 
not, when we make ethical claims, even when those are the claims of culture or of a 
‘different voice’, we always invoke the universal. The challenge is to articulate an 
ethics that simultaneously recognizes both the universal’s contamination and its 
promise. For Butler this means an ethics that is grounded in a process of cultural 
translation. 
Clearly there is an establishing rhetoric for the 
assertion of universality and a set of norms that are 
invoked in recognition of such claims. Moreover, 
there is no cultural consensus on an international 
level about what ought and ought not to be a claim 
to universality, who may make it, and what form it 
ought to take. Thus, for the claim to work, for it to 
compel consensus, and for the claim, performatively 
to enact the very universality it enunciates, it must 
undergo a set of translations into the various 
rhetorical and cultural contexts in which the 
meaning and force of universal claims are made.
56
   
   As Butler points out, translation may be understood in two different ways. It 
can operate as a process in which competing meanings are adjudicated in relation to 
an authoritative meta-language. Or, it can be understood as a process of trial and 
error, in which the understanding and endorsement of moral claims depends crucially 
on the scope for recognition and negotiation between the authors, audiences and 
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referents of the claims in question. The former understanding is the one implied by 
accounts of moral judgment in which the grounds of judgment are secured in 
universal, particular or singular. But Butler’s analysis of these accounts, following 
Hegel, has demonstrated that there is no such fixed, authoritative ground for moral 
judgment. Genuine translation, therefore, is not a matter of subsuming all languages 
under a meta-language but of forging common ground across different languages, or 
of recognizing the limits of mutual intelligibility. This is a process, according to 
Butler, which must allow for (even if it cannot guarantee) the possibility of mutual 
transformation and the articulation of more inclusive moral vocabularies. At the heart 
of this possibility is a ‘letting go’ which is foreign to the ways of thinking about 
moral judgment that are embedded in the predominant ethical traditions of the post-
reformation, post-enlightenment West. Within that context, the mark of moral 
authority is moral conviction and the heroic stance of ‘here I stand, I can do no other’. 
In contrast, Butler suggests that the ethical promise of universality depends on 
willingness to recognise its (the universal’s) essential unknowability and therefore the 
limitations of any given moral stance. 
Butler’s argument denies the possibility of definitively settling questions 
about the meaning and validity of moral claims and concepts through a process of 
judgment. In doing this, she is repeating Hegel’s lesson that the logic of universality, 
particularity and singularity in moral judgment is not ultimately a logic that can be 
grounded in one or other of the terms of judgment. The implications for moral 
judgment in an international domain are, for Butler, that moral claims must submit to 
a process of cultural translation. Butler finds inspiration for what this might mean in 
the work of postcolonial theorists such as Spivak and Gilroy, and in trans-national 
political activism around gender and human rights. In these contexts the meaning of 
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the ‘universal’ is challenged and transformed, enabling a recognition of its openness 
as a concept and of the kind of work needed to keep its promise open. 
It may be that what is right and what is 
good consist in staying open to the 
tensions that beset the most fundamental 
categories we require, in knowing 
unknowingness at the core of what we 
know, and what we need, and in 
recognizing the sign of life in what we 
undergo without certainty about what will 
come.
57
 
Conclusion 
 
 Feminist international ethics is concerned with many substantive questions about 
violence, distributive justice and human rights. However, it is also persistently haunted 
by the problem of how to authorise moral judgments across boundaries of culture and 
power. I have argued that Hegel’s critique of the ‘moral point of view’ demonstrates that 
attempts to settle these meta-ethical questions through an appeal to one of the terms of 
judgment (universality, particularity, singularity) are always unstable insofar as they 
require the abstract specification of one of these terms in contradistinction to the others. 
The dialogical turn in feminist ethics, in particular in relation to international ethical 
questions, is premised on the recognition of the difficulty of keeping universality, 
particularity and singularity distinct in the authorising of moral judgment. Nevertheless, I 
have suggested that this turn is only likely to be successful if it is accompanied by a 
recognition of the mutual contamination of the terms of judgment. In this respect, I find 
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Butler’s account of the meaning of ethical universality as a presupposition and outcome 
of communication more satisfactory than that of Benhabib.  
                                                 
1
 A version of this paper was first presented at the World International Studies Conference, Istanbul, 
August 2005. 
2
 Both thinkers count Hegel as one of the influences on their work, but I will argue that Butler’s 
philosophical position is much closer to Hegel’s than Benhabib’s. 
3
 Butler (2000).  
4
 Hegel (1977): 379-407; Hutchings, 2003: 123. For a broader consideration of the relevance of Hegel’s 
logic to his interrogation of the ‘moral point of view’, see Hutchings (2006). 
5
 Hegel (1977): 379. 
6
 Ibid: 382. 
7
 Ibid: 383. 
8
 Ibid: 383-409. 
9
 Ibid: 406-7. 
10
 Ibid: 407. Hegel’s account of the ‘beautiful soul’ draws on Goethe’s character in Wilhelm Meister’s 
Apprenticeship and Travels, see Rose’s discussion of the section ‘Confessions of a Beautiful Soul’ 
(Rose, 1992: 188-192). 
11
 This question is clearly central to the liberal/ communitarian discussion that has been a major focus 
of concern in ethical and political theory in the Western academy over the last twenty years. Thinkers 
such as Rawls (in his early work), Habermas and O’Neill have argued for forms of moral universalism 
which link the authority of moral claims to rational procedure in ways which clearly connect to Hegel’s 
account of the Kantian moral point of view; in contrast, thinkers such as MacIntyre, Walzer, Nussbaum 
and Rorty have challenged the neo-Kantian perspective in moral theory, either by re-working the 
meaning of universality or by challenging the idea that moral judgment requires a grounding in the 
universal. See Rawls (1972); Habermas (1990); O’Neill (1989); MacIntyre (1981); Walzer (1983; 
1994); Nussbaum (2000); Rorty (1993). These debates gain particular resonance when applied to issues 
with international or global reach, such as international human rights or global distributive justice, to 
the extent that within this context, theoretical perspectives have been increasingly categorised 
according to a ‘cosmopolitan’ versus ‘communitarian’ distinction, see: Nardin & Mapel (1992); Brown 
(1992; 2002); Dower (1998); Hutchings (1999a). 
12
 There are influential examples of all of these species of moral universalism in contemporary ethical 
theory: examples of Aristotelian universalism can be found in the work of MacIntyre (1981) and 
Nussbaum (2000). Examples of utilitarian universalism can be found in the work of Singer (1972). 
Examples of procedural universalism can be found in the work of Rawls (1972) and Habermas (1990). 
13
 Although communitarianism is frequently invoked as an ideal type in moral arguments, in particular 
concerning multicultural and international policy issues, it is a position that is far less commonly held 
in a strong form than the variants of moral universalism listed above. However, the later work of Rawls 
(1999) and the work of Walzer (1983; 1994) do put forward a strong (if qualified) communitarian line 
of argument in which it is argued that most moral questions can and should be answered in relation to 
the cultural context of the specific political community, rather than at the level of universal procedures 
or claims about universal human nature or human flourishing. 
14
 The categories of moral universalism and moral particularism are familiar elements in the description 
of the range of contemporary moral theory. The notion of ‘moral singularism’ is less familiar as a stock 
position in moral argument, but I would argue that it is also a long-standing alternative for moral 
thought in modernity. Essentially it derives from the combination of an ethics of virtue, which has its 
roots in a universalist accounts of what it means to be a ‘good’ person (and therefore with Aristotelian 
traditions of moral thought) and peculiarly modern Protestant and romantic ideas which insist on the 
uniqueness of the person and their private relation to God and/ or the moral law (Goethe’s and Hegel’s 
‘beautiful soul’). For moral singularists, the specificity of the person is key to the authority of their 
moral judgment, and I find this perspective exemplified in contemporary feminist ethics following the 
work of Carol Gilligan and the idea of a women’s ‘different voice’ and a feminist ethic of care 
(Gilligan, 1982; Ruddick, 1990).    
15
 See Robinson (1999). 
16
 Benhabib (1992): 178-202. 
17
 Mohanty (2003): 19-42. 
 28 
                                                                                                                                            
18
 Benhabib (1992): 23-67; Butler (1988; 2000; 2004a; 2004b). I do not mean to suggest that Hegel is 
the only major influence on these thinkers. For Benhabib, Habermas and Arendt are more significant 
inspirations for her moral theory than Hegel and, in Butler’s case, although she is more fundamentally 
Hegelian in her philosophical approach than Benhabib, Lacan and Foucault are equally important 
intellectual reference points.  
19
  Benhabib (1992). 
20
  Ibid: 170. 
21
  Ibid: 187. 
22
  Ibid.:121-124. 
23
  Ibid: 54. 
24
  Benhabib (1996). See also Benhabib (2002; 2004) for a working out of the political and institutional 
implications of her ethics in transnational and transcultural contexts. 
25
  Benhabib (2002) 
26
  Ibid: 34-35. 
27
  Ibid: 82-104. 
28
  Ibid: 36-37. 
29
  Ibid: 4. 
30
  Ibid: 39. 
31
  See Benhabib & Dallmayr (1992) 
32
  Benhabib (1992): 37. 
33
  Benhabib (2002): 39; 107. 
34
  Ibid. 106. 
35
  Ibid: 36. 
36
  Young (1997) 
37
  Ibid: 41. 
38
  Ibid: 59. 
39
  Ibid: 50. Young draws on Levinas and Irigary in formulating her notion of ‘asymmetrical 
reciprocity’. 
40
  Ibid: 53. 
41
 ‘Just because social life consists of plural experiences and perspectives, a theory of communicative 
ethics must endorse a radically democratic conception of moral and political judgment.’ (Young, 1997: 
59). 
42
  See Hutchings (1997; 1999b; 2004; 2005) for further elaboration of this kind of critique of 
Benhabib. 
43
  Hutchings (1997): 140-141. Benhabib herself would deny this conclusion, she argues that discourse 
ethics is not closed to any specific content, in the way that more substantive (or ‘substitutionalist’) 
moral theories are, and that this is its great strength (Benhabib, 2002: 13-14). However, although any 
opinion may be expressed in the process of ‘discursive validation’, some opinions contradict the norms 
underpinning the discursive exchange (they entail a ‘performative contradiction for anyone who has 
accepted those norms) and it becomes impossible for them to be taken seriously. 
44
 Benhabib (2002): 38. 
45
 Ibid: 40. 
46
 Ibid: 40. 
47
 Butler (2004a; 2004b) 
48
 Butler (1988; 2000; 2004a; 2004b) 
49
 Butler (2004a): 148 
50
 Butler (2004a): 31-2. 
51
 Butler (2004a): 1. 
52
 Butler (2004a): 2. 
53
 Butler (2004a): 33. 
54
 Butler (2000): 24. 
55
 Butler (2000): 24-5. 
56
 Butler (2000): 35. 
57
 Butler (2004a): 39. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 29 
                                                                                                                                            
S. Benhabib Situating the Self: gender, community and postmodernism in 
contemporary ethics (Cambridge, Polity, 1992). 
S. Benhabib (ed) Democracy and Difference: contesting the boundaries of the 
political (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996). 
S. Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: equality and diversity in the Global Era 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002). 
S. Benhabib The Rights of Others: aliens, residents and citizens (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
S. Benhabib and F. Dallmayr (eds) The Communicative Ethics Controversy 
(Cambridge, Polity, 1992). 
C. Brown, International Relations Theory: new normative approaches (Hemel 
Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). 
C. Brown Sovereignty, Rights and Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2002). 
J. Butler Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France 
(Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1988). 
J. Butler ‘Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism’ and 
‘Competing Universalities’ in J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Žižek Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality: contemporary dialogues of the left (London, Verso, 2000). 
J. Butler Undoing Gender (New York and London, Routledge, 2004a). 
J. Butler Precarious Life: the powers of mourning and violence (London, Verso, 
2004b). 
N. Dower World Ethics: the new agenda  (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
1998). 
C. Gilligan In a Different Voice: psychological theory and women’s development 
(Cambridge MA., Harvard University Press, 1982). 
J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1990). 
G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit translated A. V. Miller (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1977). 
K. Hutchings ‘Moral Deliberation and Political Judgement: Reflections on Benhabib’s 
Interactive Universalism’, Theory, Culture and Society, 14, 1997: 132-142. 
K. Hutchings International Political Theory: re-thinking ethics in a global era 
(London, Sage, 1999a). 
K. Hutchings ‘Feminism, Universalism and the Ethics of International Politics’, in 
Jabri & O’Gorman (eds) Women, Culture and International Relations (Boulder CO, 
Westview Press, 1999b: 17-37). 
K. Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge, Polity, 2003). 
K. Hutchings ‘From Morality to Politics and Back Again: feminist international ethics 
and the civil society argument’, Alternatives 2004 (check refs) 
K. Hutchings ‘Speaking and Hearing: Habermasian Discourse Ethics, Feminism and 
IR’, Review of International Studies January 2005 (check refs) 
K. Hutchings ‘Hegel, ethics and the logic of universality’ in K. Deligiorgi (ed) Hegel: 
new directions (Chesham, Acumen, 2006). 
A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (London, Duckworth, 1981). 
C. Mohanty Feminism Without Borders: decolonizing theory, practicing solidarity 
(Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2003). 
T. Nardin & D. R. Mapel (eds) Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
 30 
                                                                                                                                            
M. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: the capabilities approach 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000).   
O. O’Neill, Constructions of Reason (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972). 
Rawls, Law of the Peoples (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1999). 
F. Robinson Globalizing Care: ethics, feminist theory and international relations 
(Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1999). 
R. Rorty ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’ in S. Shute and S. Hurley 
(eds) On Human Rights: the Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York, Basic books, 
1993). 
G. Rose, The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992). 
S. Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: towards a politics of peace (London, The Women’s 
Press, 1990). 
P. Singer ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 1 
(1972): pp. 229-243. 
M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1983). 
M. Walzer, Thick and Thin: moral argument at home and abroad (Southbend IN, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).  
I. M. Young ‘On Moral Respect, Wonder and Enlarged Thought’ and 
‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’ in Intersecting 
Voices: dilemmas of gender, political philosophy and policy (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1997: 38-74). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
